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Recent Developments in the Termination of School
Desegregation Decrees
KEVIN BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
The remedial duty and responsibility imposed on a once segregated
school district by the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Brown
v. Board of Education' and its progeny is to take all steps necessary
to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure segregation system.
In the last two terms, the Supreme Court handed down its most significant
opinions involving de jure segregation of public elementary and secondary
education in over a decade.2 In Board of Education v. DowelP and
Freeman v. Pitts,4 the Court addressed issues related to what a school
district must establish in order to demonstrate that it has eliminated
those vestiges in whole or in part. This Article discusses what the Supreme
Court has decided regarding when a local school district has discharged
its affirmative obligation to eliminate the vestiges of all or part of its
prior discriminatory conduct. This Article also discusses the implications
of those cases for the Indianapolis Public School (IPS) desegregation
case, and will highlight issues that must be addressed to determine if
all or part of federal court supervision of the IPS system can be
terminated.
I. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. DoWELL
In Dowell, the Supreme Court faced its first opportunity to address
issues related to the termination of a school desegregation decree. The
Oklahoma City school desegregation case commenced in 1961 with the
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. B.S., 1978,
Indiana University; J.D., 1982, Yale University School of Law. The author would like
to thank Cheryl Peebles for her exceptionally fine research assistance and Kyrstie Herndon
for exceptional secretarial assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. In June of 1992, the Court also rendered an opinion in the case of United
States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). In this opinion, the Court enuciatated the
standards to apply when addressing whether the affirmative obligation to dismantle a prior
de jure segregated school system has been met in the university context. This opinion,
however, is outside the scope of this Article which is confined to de jure segregation in
elementary and secondary schools.
3. 11 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
4. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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filing of a complaint by African-American students and their parents
against the Board of Education of Oklahoma City.' In the ensuing years,
the parties struggled through the difficult task of formulating a deseg-
regation plan. This process culminated in 1972, with the district court
imposing a desegregation plan known as the "Finger Plan. ' 6 In 1977,
having found that the Finger Plan achieved the court's objectives and
that the school system was therefore "unitary," the district court ter-
minated supervision of the case. 7 Although the Board's motion was
contested, the district court's order was not appealed.' The Board,
5. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 633. In 1963, the district court found that Oklahoma
City was operating a dual school system and had segregated schools intentionally in the
past. Id. (citing Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963)).
6. In 1972, the district court ordered the Board to adopt a desegregation plan
known as the "Finger Plan." Under the Finger Plan, kindergartners would be assigned
to neighborhood schools unless their parents wished otherwise. Children in grades one to
four would attend formerly all white schools. Children in grade five would attend formerly
all black schools. Thus, the African-American children were to be transported from grades
one through four, with the white children transported only for grade five. Students in
the upper grades would be bussed to various areas to maintain integrated schools. In
integrated neighborhoods, there would be stand alone schools for all grades. Id. (citing
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972)).
7. Id. at 634. The Supreme Court noted that the meaning of the word "unitary,"
as used by the district court, was unclear. Id. at 635. The Court also noted that lower
courts had been inconsistent with their use of the term "unitary." Id. "Some have used
it to identify a school district that has completely remedied all vestiges of past discrim-
ination," and therefore accomplished their constitutional obligation. Id.; see, e.g., United
States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d
521, 533-34 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Vaughns v. Board of Educ.,
758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985).
Other courts, however, have used "unitary" to describe any school district that
has currently desegregated student assignments, whether or not that status is
solely the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan. . . . [S]uch a school
district could be called unitary and nevertheless still contain vestiges of past
discrimination.
Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 635 (citing Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Court stated that it was not sure that it
was useful "to define these terms more precisely, or to create subclasses within them."
Id. at 636. The Court found that "[t]he District Court's 1977 order [was] unclear with
respect to what it meant by unitary and the necessary result of that finding." Id. This
contradicted the Court's holding in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 438-39 (1976), which required a precise statement to the school board of its obligations
under a desegregation decree. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443-44 (1992)
(advising caution with regard to the use of the term "unitary").
8. After the Finger Plan was implemented, the Board of Education moved to
close the case in June 1975 on the ground that it had eliminated all vestiges of state
imposed .racial discrimination in its school system and that it was operating a unitary
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however, continued to operate under the Finger Plan until 1984.
In 1984, the Board of Education adopted a student reassignment
plan (SRP) which was to begin in the 1985-86 school year. Unlike the
Finger Plan, the SRP relied solely upon neighborhood school assignments
for students in grades kindergarten through four. The Board argued that
demographic changes made the increased distance that young African-
Americans were bussed under the Finger Plan too burdensome. In ad-
dition, the Board asserted its desire to increase parental involvement in
the schools. The Board felt that parental involvement was necessary for
quality education and that neighborhood school assignments would in-
crease such involvement.9 The result of the SRP, however, was to increase
significantly the racial imbalance of students in the school system's
elementary schools.' 0 In February, 1985, the plaintiffs sought to reopen
the case."
school system. The district court held in its unpublished "Order Terminating Case":
The Court has concluded that [the Finger Plan] worked and that substantial
compliance with the constitutional requirements has been achieved. The School
Board under the oversight of the Court, has operated the Plan properly, and
the Court does not foresee that the termination of its jurisdiction will result in
the dismantlement of the Plan or any affirmative action by the defendant to
undermine the unitary system so slowly and painfully accomplished over the 16
.years during which the cause has been pending before this court....
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633-34 (quoting No. Civ-9452, App. 174-76 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18,
1977)).
9. When the Board adopted its new plan, it was convinced that parental involve-
ment was essential to student academic achievement and quality education. In 1969, there
were 95 parent-teacher associations in the Oklahoma City School District with a total
membership of 26,528. When the Board implemented the SRP, there were only 15 PTAs
with a total membership of 1,377. After the SRP had been in operation for just two
years, the number of PTA organizations had increased by 200% and membership had
increased by 144%. Open house attendance was up 5,167, and 3,745 more parents attended
parent/teacher conferences in 1986-87 than in the year preceding the implementation of
the SRP. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1516-17 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
10. Under the SRP, at least 96.9% of the students in 11 of the 64 elementary
schools were black and "44016 of all Afro-American children in grades K-4 were assigned
to these schools." Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting). At least 90% of
the students in 22 other schools were non-African-Americans. The remaining 31 schools
were racially mixed. Id. The SRP did not affect faculty and staff integration. Id. at 634.
11. Id. at 641. The district court concluded that the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel prohibited the plaintiffs from challenging the district court's 1977 findings
that the school system was "unitary." Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548,
1555 (W.D. Okla 1985). Because unitariness had been achieved, the district court concluded
that court-ordered desegregation should come to an end. The Tenth Circuit reversed. 795
F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 479 U.S. 938 (1986). It held that nothing in the 1977
order indicated that the 1972 injunction itself was terminated, even though the order's
unitary finding was binding upon the parties. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the finding
that the system was "unitary" merely ended, the district court's active supervision of the
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The district court eventually found that demographic changes made
the Finger Plan unworkable and that the school district had bussed
students for more than a decade in good-faith compliance with the
court's orders. 2 The district court also found that the Board had done
nothing for twenty-five years to promote residential segregation, and
that the present residential segregation in Oklahoma City was the result
of private decision making and economics. It was, therefore, too at-
tenuated to be a vestige of former school segregation. 3 The district court
went on to hold that the previous injunctive decree should be vacated
and the school district returned completely to local control.' 4
The Tenth Circuit reversed, writing that "an injunction takes on a
life of its own and becomes an edict quite independent of the law it
is meant to effectuate."" The Tenth Circuit approached the case "not
so much as one dealing with desegregation, but as one dealing with the
proper application of the federal law on injunctive remedies.' ' 6 Relying
on United States v. Swift & Co.,' 7 the Tenth Circuit held that a de-
segregation decree remains in effect until a school district can show
"'grievous wrong evoked by new and unforseen conditions""..8 and
"'dramatic changes in conditions unforseen at the time of the decree
that ... impose extreme and unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the
obligor." '" 9 The Tenth Circuit held that the Board of Education failed
to meet this burden; therefore, the desegregation decree remained in
effect.20
In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court held that the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Swift was
mistaken.2' The Court noted that the test espoused by the Tenth Circuit
case. Because the school district was still subject to the desegregation decree, the respondents
could challenge the SRP. The case was remanded to the district court to determine if the
desegregation decree should be lifted or modified. 795 F.2d at 1522-23.
12. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1512-13 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1526.
15. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the
Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986)).
16. Id. at 1486.
17. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
18. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 109 (1932)).
19. Id. (quoting Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification
of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1101, 1110 (1986)).
20. Id. at 1505-06.
21. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630, 636-37 (1991). Justice Marshall
wrote a vigorous dissent in which Justices Stevens and Blackmun joined. For a discussion
of Justice Marshall's dissent, see infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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would subject a school district to judicial tutelage for an indefinite
future. Such an extreme result could not be justified by the principles
governing the entry and dissolution of injunctive decrees, nor the com-
mands of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court emphasized that a
school desegregation decree is warranted only as a temporary measure
intended to displace local decision making authority until transition to
a unitary nonracial system of public education is achieved:
[A] finding by the District Court that the Oklahoma City School
District was being operated in compliance with the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and that it was unlikely that the school board would return to
its former ways, would be a finding that the purposes of the
desegregation litigation had been fully achieved.22
The Court also indicated that a desegregation decree should be dissolved
after the local authorities have operated in compliance with it for a
reasonable period of time. 23
The Court remanded the case to the district court, with instructions
for the district court to determine:
whether the Board made a sufficient showing of constitutional
compliance as of 1985, when the SRP was adopted, to allow
the injunction to be dissolved. The District Court should address
itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges
of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent prac-
ticable. 24
To provide further direction on what factors lower courts should
consider in determining whether a school system has eliminated the
vestiges of de jure segregation as far as practicable, the Supreme Court
cited its 1968 opinion in Green v. County School Board:25
22. Id. at 636-37 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 637.
24. Id. at 638. On remand, the district court held: (1) that the school board had
complied in good faith with the initial desegregation decree from the time it was entered
until adoption of the neighborhood school plan; (2) that there was no indication that the
school board would return to a system of de jure segregation in the future; (3) that the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable; (4) that the
Board was entitled to complete dissolution of the initial decree; and (5) that the neigh-
borhood school system was adopted for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in compliance
with applicable equal protection principles. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144,
1196 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
25. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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In considering whether the vestiges of de jure segregation had
been eliminated as far as practicable, the District Court should
look not only at student assignments, but "to every facet of
school operations . . . . [E]xisting policy and practice with regard
to faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities, and
facilities are among the most important indicia of a segregated
system. "126
The respondents also had contended that the Tenth Circuit held that
the district court's finding-that residential segregation in Oklahoma City
was the result of private decisionmaking and economics and too atten-
uated to be a vestige of the former school segregation-was clearly
erroneous. The Court concluded, however, that the Tenth Circuit's find-
ing on this point was at least ambiguous. To dispel any doubt, the
Court directed that the district court and the court of appeals treat this
question as res nova.27
Finally, the Court stated that once a school system has eliminated
the vestiges of de jure segregation, the school system no longer requires
court authorization for the promulgation of policies and rules regulating
matters such as the assignment of students.2" Challenges to subsequent
actions by school boards, including those related to student reassignments,
should be evaluated by the equal protection principles articulated in
Washington v. Davis9 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.a0
II. FREEMAN V. PITTS
In Dowell, the district court had relinquished, all remedial control
over the Oklahoma City School System. By contrast, in Freeman v.
Pitts,3 the district court had determined that control could be relinquished
only over those aspects of the system in which the vestiges of the prior
discriminatory conduct had been eradicated. The district court retained
supervisory authority over the aspects of the school system that were
not in full compliance.3 2 Dekalb County School System (DCSS) is located
in a suburban area outside of Atlanta, Georgia. In 1968, African-
American school children and their parents instituted this class action.
26. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991) (citing Green). These
criteria for evaluation are now known as "the Green factors."
27. Id. at 638 n.2.
28. Id. at 638.
29. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
30. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
31. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
32. Id. at 1435-36.
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After the suit was filed, DCSS worked out a comprehensive desegregation
plan with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).
The district court approved the proposed plan and entered a consent
order in June, 1969. Under the plan, all of the former de jure black
schools in DCSS were closed and their students were reassigned to the
remaining neighborhood schools. The district court found that DCSS
was desegregated for a short period of time under this court-ordered
plan.
According to the Supreme Court, between 1969 and 1986, the res-
pondents sought only infrequent and limited judicial intervention.33 The
population in Dekalb County grew significantly between 1969 and 1986.
Whites migrated to the northern part of the county, while African-
Americans migrated to the southern part. In 1969, African-Americans
made up only 5.6% of the student body of DCSS. By the 1986-87 school
year, however, their percentage had increased to 47%. A significant
amount of racial imbalance in student school assignments also existed
in DCSS. Half of the African-American students attended schools that
were over 9001o black, and 62% of them attended schools that had over
200% more black students than the system-wide average. Of the white
students enrolled in DCSS, 27% attended schools that were over 9007o
white, and 59% of them attended schools where the percentage of white
students exceeded by 2006 the system-wide average of white students.
Despite this amount of racial imbalance in the schools, in 1986 the
School Board filed a motion for final dismissal of the litigation. The
district court examined whether DCSS had complied with the Green
factors. Even though there was a significant racial imbalance in student
assignments, the district court found that DCSS was unitary not only
with regard to student assignments, but also in the areas of transportation,
physical facilities, and extracurricular activities.3 4 The district court con-
cluded that the racial imbalance of the students was attributable to the
rapid demographic shifts that had occurred in DeKalb County, and other
factors, but not to the prior unconsituttional conduct of DCSSY5
33. Id. at i437.
34. Id. at 1442.
35. Id. at 1440. The district court examined the interaction between DCSS policy
and the demographic changes in DeKalb County. Of the 170 changes made by DCSS,
only three were found to have had a partial segregative effect, and that effect was
considered minor. The district court concluded that DCSS achieved the maximum practical
desegregation. It found that the existing segregation of students attributable to demographic
shifts that were inevitable as the result of suburbanization, the decline in the number of
children born to white families, blockbusting of formerly white neighborhoods, which led
to "selling and buying of real estate in the DeKalb area on a highly dynamic basis ...
and the completion of Interstate 20, which made access from DeKalb County into the
City of Atlanta much easier. Id.
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In addition to the Green Factors, the district court also considered
whether the quality of education being offered to the white and black
student population was equal. Because of the existence of such a large
amount of racial imbalance, there were many schools in the system that
were predominately black or predominately white. The district court not
only examined resource allocation, but also examined measures of student
achievement. The district court found that vestiges of the dual system
remained in the areas of teacher and principlas assignments (one of the
Green Factors).16 The district court also found that DCSS assigned
experienced teachers and teachers with graduate degrees in a racially
imbalanced manner" and that DCSS spends more money educating white
students than it does on the education of black students. 8 The district
court ordered DCSS to equalize per pupil expenditures and to assign
experienced teachers and teachers with advanced degrees equally between
the primarily black schools and the primarily white schools.3 9 The district
court, however, rejected the notion that DCSS had not done enough to
improve the educational performance of black students, specifically citing
to improvements by African-American students on the Iowa Tests of
Basic Skills and the Scholastic Apptitude Test of DCSS' black students.4
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's incremental approach
to the elimination of vestiges of prior de jure conduct. It held that the
district court had erred in considering the six Green factors as separate
categories. 41 In order for a school system to achieve unitary status, it
must satisfy all of the Green factors at the same time for at least three
years.4 2 The Eleventh Circuit also held that a system that once had been
segregated by law could not justify continued racial imbalance by pointing
to demographic changes, at least until the system had eradicated all
vestigies of segregation.4 1 Given that DCSS had not done this, the
Eleventh Circuit held that it bore the responsibility for the current racial
imbalance and had to correct that imbalance."
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, 45 the Supreme
Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Green factors
36. Id. at 1441.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1442.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1441-42.
41. Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989).
42. Id. at 1450.
43. Id. at 1449.
44. Id. at 1448-49.
45. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1435-50 (1992). Justice Kennedy's opinion
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White, Scalia, and Souter. In
[Vol. 26:867
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
could be considered separately and that partial relinquishment of su-
pervision and control of a school system in an appropriate case does
not offend the Constitution:
We hold that, in the course of supervising desegregation plans,
federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and
control of school districts in incremental stages, before full
compliance has been achieved in every area of school opera-
tions .... [U]pon a finding that a school system subject to a
court-supervised desegregation plan is in compliance in some but
not all areas, the court in appropriate cases may return control
to the school system in those areas where compliance has been
achieved, limiting further judicial supervision to operations that
are not yet in full compliance with the court decree. In particular,
the district court may determine that it will not order further
remedies in the area of student assignments where racial im-
balance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional
violations.46
Kennedys opinion emphasized that the decision to withdraw partial
supervision lay in the sound discretion of the district court,47 His opinion
went on to note that a number of factors are to be considered in
determining whether partial withdrawal is warranted: First, whether there
has been full and satisfactory compliance with the court decree in those
parts of the system where supervision is being withdrawn; second, whether
retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve com-
pliance with the decree in other areas of the school system; and finally,
whether the school district has demonstrated, both to the public and to
the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good faith
commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions
of the law and Constitution that were the basis for judicial intervention
in the first place. 4 Kennedy went on to note that in considering these
factors a court should give particular attention to the school system's
record of compliance. A school system is in a better position to dem-
onstrate "[a] good-faith commitment to a constitutional course of action
addition to joining the opinion of the Court, Justices Scalia and Souter also wrote separate
concurring opinions. For a discussion of Souter's concurrence, see infra notes 63-67, 104-
06 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Scalia's concurrence, see infra note 83,
94, 99-100 and accompanying text.
46. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445-46. Kennedy noted that this position was the
actual position the Court took in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424
(1976). Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1444-45 (1992).
47. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
48. Id.
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when its policies form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct .. .149
Both parties to the litigation agreed that quality of education was
a legitimate subject of inquiry for the district court. The Supreme Court,
therefore, indicated that it was not necessary for it to review this aspect
of the lower court's actions. However, the Court approvingly noted that
the district court's consideration of quality of education illustrated the
fact that the Green factors were not to be a rigid framework. 0
One of the major issues in this case was whether the district court
was correct in releasing its control over student assignments. Justice
Kennedy specifically examined whether the district court in Freeman had
appropriately exercised its discretion when it withdrew supervision from
DCSS's student assignments. The Court wrote:
Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to
be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a con-
stitutional violation. Once the racial imbalance due to the de
jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no
duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.5'
Kennedy's opinion made it clear that "[tihe school district bears the
burden of showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a
proximate way, to the prior violation. 5 2 Kennedy went on to add,
however, that if a school district's desegregation plan has eliminated all
racial imbalance attributable to the district's prior unlawful segregation,
then the district court is under no duty to remedy an imbalance that'
is caused by demographic factors."
Much of the remaining discussion in the Court's opinion related to
the issue of whether the existing student segregation should be said to
be attributable either to private decision making or to the original
constitutional violation and subsequent action by the state.54 The Court's
analysis of this issue turned on the fact that the existing student seg-
regation was the result of residential segregation.55 As a result, it was
necessary to inquire into the basis of residential segregation. If the
residential segregation can be traced to factors other than the state's
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1446-47.
51. Id. at 1447. The Court went on to quote from its opinion in Swann. "[I]n
the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the
State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial
composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary."
Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1448.
54. Id. at 1447-50.
55. Id. at 1448.
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attempt to fix or alter demographic patterns, then the residential seg-
regation is not traceable to state action.
Kennedy noted that our society is a very mobile one.16 Given the
disparate preferences between blacks and whites with respect to the racial
mix of neighborhoods, it is unlikely that racially stable neighborhoods
will emerge.5 7 Where resegregation is the product of private choices, the
Court concludes that it does not have constitutional implications.
It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of
federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous
and massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results would
require ongoing and never-ending supervision by the courts of
school districts simply because they were once de jure segre-
gated."8
The Court's opinion also considered whether retention of judicial
control over student attendance was necessary to achieve compliance
with other facets of the school system that were not in compliance. 9
The Court wrote that racial balancing of student assignments may be
a legitimate remedial device to correct other fundamental inequities that
were themselves caused by the constitutional violation. The Court noted
that there was no showing that racial balancing was an appropriate
mechanism to cure those aspects of the school system that were not in
compliance at the time the district court released supervision of student
assignments.60 The case was remanded so that the district court could
make specific findings with respect to whether it was necessary to retain
control over student assignments in order to accomplish compliance in
the areas that were not then in compliance. 6'
In addition, the Court noted that the district court did not address
the issue stated in Dowell regarding the good faith compliance by the
school district with the court order over a reasonable period of time.
A history of good-faith compliance is evidence that any current
racial imbalance is not the product of a new de jure violation,
56. "In one year (from 1987 to 1988) over 40 million Americans, or 17.6% of
the total population, moved households.... Over a third of those people moved to a
different county, and over six million migrated between States." Id. at 1447-48 (citing
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., p.
19, Table 25 (11th ed. 1991)).
57. According to evidence heard by the district court, African-Americans prefer a
50%-50% neighborhood racial mix, whereas whites prefer a mix of 80% white and 20%
black. Id. at 1448.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1449.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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and enables the district court to accept the school board's rep-
resentation that it has accepted the principle of racial equality
and will not suffer intentional discrimination in the future. 62
Justice Souter added a brief concurrence. 63 The opinion of the Court
indicated that judicial control of student and faculty assignments may
remain necessary to remedy the persisting vestiges of a dual system.
Souter wrote separately, however, to note two additional situations in
which continued judicial control may be necessary. First is the situation
where the demographic change toward segregated residential patterns is
itself caused by past school segregation and the patterns of thinking
that segregation creates.6 "Such demographic change is not an inde-
pendent, supervening cause of racial imbalance in the student body, ...
and before deciding to relinquish supervision and control over student
assignments, a district court should make findings on the presence or
absence of this relationship. ' 6
A second, related causal relationship occurs after the district court
relinquishes supervision over a remedied aspect, and future imbalance
in that remedied aspect is caused by remaining vestiges of the dual
system. In other words, the vestige of discrimination in one aspect
becomes the incubator for resegregation in others. Justice Souter discussed
the potential that segregated faculties could send whites and blacks into
schools based on faculty race and, as a result, increase student segregation
along those lines. 6 Even though the student assignment problem had
been remedied, it is possible that segregation of students could be the
result of the fact that people moved to the schools where the faculty
were segregated. Consequently, before a district court ends its supervision
of student assignments, it should make a finding that there is no im-
mediate threat of unremedied Green-type factors causing population or
student enrollment changes that, in turn, may imbalance student com-
position. 67
Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined
by Justices Stevens and O'Connor.68 Blackmun agreed with what he
considered to be the holding of the Court, that in some circumstances
a district court need not interfere with a particular portion of a school
system while retaining jurisdiction over the entire system. He also agreed
62. Id. at 1449-50.
63. Id. at 1454-55 (Souter, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1454 (Souter, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1454 (Souter, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 1454-55 (Souter, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
68. This case was argued before Justice Thomas took the bench; he did not
participate in the decision.
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that the good faith of the school board is relevant in inquiries about
the elimination of the vestiges of state imposed segregation. Finally, he
agreed that DCSS must balance student assignments if an imbalance is
traceable to unlawful state policy and if such an order is necessary to
fashion an effective remedy. He wrote separately to address what it
means for the district court to retain jurisdiction over a part of the
case while relinquishing supervision and control over a subpart of the
school system. 69 He agreed that, although active supervision over a
particular aspect of a school system could be relinquished, the court
must still retain jurisdiction over the entire system as a whole. The
district court, therefore, has the ability to reassert active control over
those areas from which it has withdrawn.
Justice Blackmun also discussed the issue of racial imbalance being
traceable to the board actions. According to Blackmun, DCSS did not
escape its duty to desegregate merely by showing "that demographics
exacerbated the problem." 70 Rather, DCSS must prove that its own
polices-including, for example, faculty assignment, placement of new
schools, and the closing of old schools-did not contribute to residential
segregation. For Blackmun, district courts must examine policies and
practices of the school district closely to determine if they contribute
to residential segregation. Blackmun noted that the district court in
Freeman had not properly engaged in that inquiry. According to Black-
mun, the available evidence suggested that this would be a difficult
burden for DCSS to meet.
71
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DOWELL AND FREEMAN
There are some clear implications that flow from the Supreme Court's
opinions in these two cases. To begin with, because the Court emphasized
that federal judicial supervision was intended to be temporary, it follows
that at some point in time, school districts should be allowed to terminate
court supervision. When that time is reached, the existing desegregation
decree would be dissolved. Complete authority over student and faculty
assignments and other aspects of the school system is returned to school
authorities. A school district is free to adopt new student and faculty
assignment policies, even if an increase in the amount of racial imbalance
occurs. The decision to adopt and implement such policies is to be
analyzed under the traditional test of discriminatory intent for equal
protection violations articulated by the Court in Washington v. Davis 2
69. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1455-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. Id. at 1457 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. at 1457-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
72. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.7
A. Good Faith Compliance
Beyond these relatively clear aspects, issues involving the termination
of court supervision are somewhat opaque. The Court's opinions in
Dowell and Freeman give district courts broad discretion in determining
whether partial or complete withdrawal of court supervision is warranted.
For purposes of determining the elimination of all or part of the vestiges
of the prior de jure conduct, the Court requires lower courts to examine
the Green factors, which represent the observable racial balance. Both
Dowell and Freeman, however, suggest that racial imbalance may not
be the primary consideration in determining whether all or part of court
supervision should be terminated. In Dowell, the Court accepted the
possibility that after a desegregation decree is dissolved, current residential
segregation can justify subsequent resegregation of students. In Freeman,
the Court accepted the possibility that the vestiges of prior de jure
conduct with regard to student assignments can be eliminated even if
a significant amount of racial imbalance with respect to students exists
at the time of the decision to terminate partial supervision.
In both cases, the Court noted that one prerequisite to partial or
complete termination of court supervision is good faith compliance by
the school district with the court decree for a reasonable period of
time. 74 The Court also noted the importance of a determination that a
school system will not return to its former ways of engaging in inten-
tionally discriminatory practices." It appears that the Court is requiring
that school districts demonstrate that their attitude about African-Amer-
icans is positive. A school system no doubt must do more than simply
indicate its changed attitude and willingness to comply with the Con-
stitution. Specific policies, decisions, and courses of action must be
examined in order to assess the school's good faith commitment.76
The Supreme Court did not mention whether the good faith com-
mitment requires a commitment to integration. The Tenth Circuit, in
applying the Supreme Court's opinions in Dowell and Freeman to the
original lawsuit in Brown v. Board of Education,77 however, concluded:
73. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
74. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446, 1449-50; Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct.
630, 637-38 (1991). In his concurring opinion in Freeman, Justice Blackmun also agreed
that the good faith of the school board is relevant in inquiries about the elimination of
vestiges of state imposed segregation. 112 S. Ct. at 1455 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment).
75. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445; Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 636-37.
76. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446; Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636-37.
77. Brown v. Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992).
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we are convinced that evaluation of the "good faith" prong of
the Dowell test must include consideration of a school system's
continued commitment to integration. A school system that views
compliance with a school desegregation plan as a means by which
to return to student assignment practices that produce numerous
racially identifiable schools cannot be acting in "good faith. ' 78
This interpretation of the Tenth Circuit, however, appears to be incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Dowell. Recall that as the
Supreme Court addressed the situation in Oklahoma City, it also had
in front of it the decision by the Oklahoma City School Board to adopt
a neighborhood school attendance plan.7 9 The effect of that plan was
to substantially increase racial segregation in school assignments over
those contained in the court ordered desegregation plan. The Supreme
Court's instruction in Dowell to the lower courts on remand did not
require them to assess the segregative effect of the neighborhood atten-
dance plan in addressing the good faith requirement. 0 Rather, the Court
held that any subsequent decisions by the school board after termination
of the desegregation decree must be judged by the traditional intent
standards normally applied in equal protection challenges. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Dowell, therefore, appears to contradict the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation that the good faith component requires a school
system to be committed to integration."' Rather, with regard to future
actions, the school board must be committed to the traditional equal
protection test, which focuses upon discriminatory intent.
B. Residential Segregation as a Vestige of the Prior De Jure
Conduct
Perhaps the most complex issue in determining whether court su-
pervision should be released in whole or in part is the existence of
78. Id. at 592 (citing Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 637 (1991)).
79. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
80. If the Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the
good faith requirement, such an analysis would have been required by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the Court's opinion in Dowell was issued over the strong dissent by Justice
Marshall that was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Marshall was clearly
concerned about the resegregative effect of adopting a neighborhood school attendance
policy. Dowell, ll S. Ct. at 644-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. It may be that the Tenth Circuit was concerned about the possible resegregative
impact of terminating school desegregation decrees, feeling that a movement to neigh-
borhood schools would increase segregation of public schools and thereby make a mockery
out of all of the effort that went into desegregating America's public schools over the
past 40 years. Nevertheless, it appears as if that is the precise result that is sanctioned
by the Supreme Court's opinions in Dowell and Freeman.
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current residential segregation. Prior to Dowell, the Supreme Court had
not addressed whether residential segregation could be considered a vestige
of operating a dual school system.8 2 Both Dowell and Freeman require
an examination into the causes of current residential segregation in order
to determine whether it is the result of private decision making or state
action. "[T]he principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in ...
public schools across the country-North and South-is the imbalance
in residential patterns."" 3 Residential segregation is a way of life in the
United States and is likely to remain so for sometime.14 Hence, the
Court's resolution of how to treat current residential segregation is likely
to have profound implications for the termination of existing school
desegregation decrees.
Residential segregation is the result of many diverse influences,
including discrimination by private organizations as well as private in-
dividuals acting pursuant to their own social and economic reasons. 5
82. See Drew S. Days, III, School Desegregation Law in the 1980s: Why Isn't
Anybody Laughing?, 95 YALE L.J. 1737 (1986) (reviewing PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND
BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985) and stating that Dimond's
book provides a compelling rebuttal to those who claim that residential segregation is the
result of purely advantageous events).
83. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1451 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
In addition to joining the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Scalia criticized the Court because it did not articulate an easily applicable test
to determine whether or not residential segregation is the result of public or private action.
He noted that racially imbalanced schools resulting from residential segregation are the
result of a blend of public and private actions. As a result, it is impossible to separate
out what part is public from what part is private, and the attempt to do so is only
guesswork. He argued for a standard with respect to residential segregation that if school
boards adopt plans allowing for neighborhood schools and for free choice of other schools
(transportation paid), then the constitutional violation with respect to students should be
considered remedied. Id. at 1450-54 (Scalia, J., concurring). "[Wlhatever racial imbalances
such a free-choice system might produce would be the product of private forces." Id. at
1452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 50-51, 54-55 (1978); Deleeuw et al.,
Housing, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT 119, 145-55 (W. Gorham & N. Glazer eds., 1976);
Farley, Residential Segregation and its Implications for School Integration, in THE COURTS,
SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 164, 169 (B. Levin & W. Hawley eds.,
1975); Albert I. Hermalin & Reynolds Farley, The Potential for Residential Integration
in Cities and Suburbs: Implications for the Busing Controversy, 38 AM. Soc. REV. 595,
605-08 (1973).
85. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. I Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 222-23 (1973),
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, said that, in his opinion, housing
separation of the races resulted from purely natural and neutral nonstate causes. Presumably
what Powell meant was that housing segregation was the result of private choices. Chief
Justice Burger and current Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with Powell in his separate
opinion in Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976), in which
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Residential segregation is also, in part, the result of discriminatory
activities by non-school governmental authorities at the federal, state,
and local level. Prior actions by governmental authorities have impacted
on the amount of residential segregation that exists in the United States
today. In the past, local authorities often prohibited integrated neigh-
borhoods through the use of city ordinances, 6 zoning practices, 7 and
by segregating public housing."' Racial discrimination by state authorities
existed with respect to the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. 9
Federal authorities contributed to segregated housing with the requirement
that houses qualifying for federal mortgage insurance programs have
racially restrictive covenants. 90 Residential segregation is also a product
of the operation of a dual school system.9' Over twenty years ago, Chief
Justice Burger noted that people gravitate toward school facilities. Just
as schools are located in response to the needs of people, the location
of schools may also influence residential patterns.92
Powell wrote, in a concurrence, "[elconomic pressures and voluntary preferences are the
primary determinants of residential patterns." See also Clark, Residential Segregation in
American Cities: A Review and Interpretation, 5 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 95-127
(1986). Dr. Clark was commissioned by the United States Commission on Civil Rights
to conduct a study and present his findings on the causes of residential segregation. He
concluded that the following factors influence residential segregation today: (1) economics
and housing affordability; (2) personal preferences and social relationships; (3) urban
structure; and (4) private discrimination.
86. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1160 (W.D. Okla.
1991). o
87. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
88. See, e.g., PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUsING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN
SEGREGATION (1985). The author talks about residential segregation and about government
culpability in creating it. He uses Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), as a primary
case, supplemented by shorter discussions of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
89. It was not until 1948 that the Supreme Court struck down racially restrictive
covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90. The Federal Housing Administration required the assertion of racially restricted
covenants in all properties which received FHA insurance until 1949. DIMOND, supra note
84 at 184.
91. The Supreme Court noted the interrelationship and possibility, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971), that the location of schools
may influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area, and have
an important impact on the composition of inner-city neighborhoods. See also Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979); DIMOND, supra note 88, at 56-
59. Dimond argues that school boards' actions help create segregated neighborhoods because
families tend to move near the schools that their school age children attend.
92. Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21. The Court also noted that discriminatory school
assignment polices "may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined
with neighborhood zoning, further lock the school system into the mold of separation of
the races." Id. at 21.
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As the Court approached the issue of how to treat residential seg-
regation', it was given the opportunity of choosing between positions
articulated by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Board of Education v.
DowelP3 and by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Freeman v.
Pitts.94 Marshall's opinion noted the role that the state and local officials
and the Board of Education of Oklahoma City played in creating what
he described as self-perpetuating patterns of residential segregation. 9 In
Oklahoma, city residential segregation was originally enforced by an
Oklahoma City ordinance that specified the areas in which blacks and
whites were to live.96 African-Americans today are still the primary
residents in the areas originally ceded to them, even though that law
was declared unconstitutional in 1935 by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 97
Marshall, therefore, took the position that current residential segregation
was a vestige of prior de jure conduct, because state action resulted in
self-perpetuating patterns of residential segregation. For Marshall, de-
segregation decrees should remain in effect when it is clear that their
removal would result in a significant number of racially identifiable
schools due to residential segregation that could otherwise be prevented. 9
By contrast, in Freeman Scalia argued that it is impossible to de-
termine what part of residential segregation is traceable to public action
and what part is private. Moreover, the attempt to do so is only
guessworkP* Scalia proposed a standard with respect to residential seg-
regation that would say if school boards adopt plans that allow for
neighborhood schools and for free choice of other schools (transportation
paid), then the vestiges of the prior discriminatory conduct with respect
to students should be considered remedied. "[W]hatever racial imbalances
such a free-choice system might produce would be deemed the product
of private forces."l0
In Freeman, Kennedy's opinion rejected both of these positions and
instead sought a middle ground. Kennedy's opinion in effect forces lower
courts to determine the cause of existing residential segregation. Racially
93. 111 S. Ct. 630, 639-48 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1450-54 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
95. As I understand the use of the term "self-perpetuating patterns of residential
segregation," Justice Marshall is referring to residential segregation. It does not matter
whether the character of segregated neighborhoods was created recently with the movement
of one racial group out of a given area and the movement of another racial group into
that area, or whether the segregated neighborhood is one of long standing duration. What
is important is the existence of segregated residential patterns.
96. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1160 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
97. Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935).
98. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630, 644 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1452 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Id.
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imbalanced neighborhood schools that are the product of private resi-
dential decision making are not based upon de jure segregation's negative
stigmatic assumptions about African-Americans. Kennedy appears to
accept the notion that such schools are based upon legitimate educational
and community benefits derived from neighborhood schools. Neighbor-
hood schools minimize the safety hazards to children in reaching school,
reduce the cost of transporting students so that more funds can be
allocated to educational matters, ease pupil placement and administrative
costs through easily determined student assignment policies, and increase
communication between home and school. 10' The School Board of Okla-
homa City specifically argued that its primary reasons for adopting the
SRP were to increase parental involvement and to increase the level of
community involvement and support in the schools. Neighborhood schools
allow for greater parental involvement and thereby improve the academic
environment for the youngsters in those schools.
Even though Justice Souter joined the Court's opinion in Freeman,
he also wrote a separate concurrence that appears to be directed toward
school systems other than DCSS. Souter's concurring opinion is enig-
matic. Justice Souter specifically addressed the issue of residential seg-
regation and satisfying his concurring opinion is necessary in order to
achieve a five-person majority. 0 2 Justice Souter's concurring opinion
appears to require a district court to do more with regard to residential
segregation than Kennedy's opinion. Souter noted that prior to relin-
quishing supervision and control over student assignments, a district
court should make findings that racial imbalance in students assignments
is not caused by past school segregation and "the patterns of thinking
that segregation creates."13 Justice Souter unfortunately did not elaborate
on what he meant by racial imbalance caused by "patterns of thinking
that segregation creates."
Because Justice Souter joined Kennedy's opinion, it can be inferred
that if segregated residential neighborhoods are of recent origins-like
those in Dekalb County-they are less likely to be products of patterns
of thinking that segregation creates. For neighborhoods that have been
segregated for sometime, however, the analysis is on considerably less
firm ground. 1' 4
101. See, e.g. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 60 (6th Cir. 1966).
102. Although Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion that addressed
the issue of residential segregation, his test is relatively easy to satisfy.
103. 112 S. Ct. at 1454 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
104. Justice Souter did not take part in the Court's decision in Dowell. It could
be that Souter is attempting to revive Justice Marshall's notion of self-perpetuating patterns
of residential segregation-at least with regard to residential neighborhoods that have been
segregated for some time. These patterns could be seen as resulting from patterns of
thinking that segregation creates.
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Justice Souter may be drawing a distinction between racially seg-
regated neighborhoods that develop after the implementation of a school
desegregation decree-like those that existed in DeKalb County-and
those that predated court supervision. For segregated neighborhoods of
recent origin, it will be easier to attribute their development to private
decision-making and not to state action. However, segregated neigh-
borhoods that exist today and whose origins predate court supervision
are more likely to reflect "the patterns of thinking that segregation
creates." Justice Souter may be less likely to agree that court supervision
over student assignments in these neighborhoods should be released as
readily as those in the kinds of segregated neighborhoods-those that
developed after court supervision-that the court encountered in Dekalb
County.
If Justice Souter is making this kind of distinction, he appears to
be at odds with how Justice Kennedy's opinion would view segregated
neighborhoods that predated court supervision. It should be recalled that
Justice Souter was the only Justice in Freeman who did not participate
in the Court's opinion in Dowell. As Marshall noted in his dissenting
opinion in Dowell, there were neighborhoods in Oklahoma City where
segregation could be traced back to governmental action that occurred
over fifty years ago. The majority in Dowell implicitly rejected Marshall's
concept of "self-perpetuating patters of residential segregation." Justice
Kennedy also focused on the mobility of people in the United States
in his opinion in Freeman. This indicates that it is the sheer fact of
moving that is important to Kennedy. For Kennedy, whether blacks
move into neighborhoods that were historically black prior to court
supervision and whites move into neighborhoods that were historically
white prior to the initiation of desegregation appears to be irrelevant.
The relevant issue appears to be mobility.
C. Conversion of School Desegregation Lawsuits to Quality
Education Lawsuits
The Supreme Court's opinion in Freeman v. Pitts'05 has the potential
to lead to a conversion of desegregation lawsuits into quality of education
lawsuits. The Court's opinion in Freeman provides that a district court
with a considerable amount of discretion with respect to whether in an
appropriate case it can terminate its control over certain aspects of a
school system while maintaining control over other aspects. 1°6 In addition,
the Court's opinion also approved the district court's considering of
quality of education between the existing black and white schools as an
additional factor in determining whether or not supervision over a school
105. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992).
106. Id.
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desegregation decree should be released. This sets up the possibility for
a district court-under proper circumstances-to release control over
student assignments. But the district court could also maintain control
over other aspects of the school system in order to assure that any
racially imbalanced schools receive equal quality education, including
equal funding. The effect would be to convert desegregation lawsuits to
quality education lawsuits. This is the most likely result of the Court's
opinion of Freeman.
IV. THE INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASE
On May 31, 1968, the Department of Justice filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana alleging that
the Indianapolis School Board operated a racially segregated school
system.10 7 Starting in 1971, 387 African-American students were bussed
to Franklin Township schools. Two years later, the district court ordered
the Indianapolis School Board to desegregate.108 The Board decided to
bus students within IPS districts and also sought to bus students across
school district lines to contiguous suburban school systems. On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit restricted the student transfers to within Marion
County.
There are a number of school systems with cross-district desegregation
plans.109 IPS, however, is one of the few school systems that has a
mandatory, as opposed to voluntary, cross-district bussing component.
The cross-district bussing feature of the IPS desegregation case creates
a number of issues that were not addressed by the Supreme Court in
its two recent opinions. In addition, the mandatory feature of the cross-
district desegregation plan will create a number of relatively unique issues
that many lower courts with voluntary cross-district plans will not have
to address as they terminate court supervision.
For purposes of terminating a portion of federal court supervision,
it might be legally possible to separate the intradistrict desegregation of
107. William E. Marsh, The Indianapolis Experience: The Anatomy of a Deseg-
regation Case 9 IND. L. REV. 897, 904 (1976).
108. United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 368 F. Supp. 1191
(S.D. Ind. 1973).
109. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 344 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd,
555 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986) (Wilmington, Del.);
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 433
(8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986) (Little Rock, Ark.); Hoots
v. Pennsylvania, 510 F. Supp. 615, 622 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982) (suburban Pittsburgh); and Turner v. Warren
County Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (rural N.C.).
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IPS from the interdistrict desegregation plan.110 If so, much of the
analysis from Dowell and Freeman can be applied to an attempt to
terminate court supervision over all or part of either the interdistrict or
the intradistrict desegregation plan. The Indianapolis School Board, for
example, might seek to eliminate all or part of the court supervision
over the intradistrict portion of the desegregation plan, while allowing
the federal district court to maintain its control over the cross-district
elements of the desegregation plan. This Article will, therefore, address
the matters that will be central to an analysis of whether all or part
of the district court's supervision over the intradistrict aspects of the
IPS desegregation plan could be released. I will conclude this Article
by highlighting some of the issues that termination of all or part of the
cross-district elements of the desegregation plan will have to resolve.
The intradistrict desegregation plan for IPS was put into effect in
1973, and has been in operation for the past 20 years. When the School
Board in Dowel! adopted a neighborhood student assignment plan, it
had operated under its court approved desegregation plan for only twelve
years."' In Freeman v Pitts, the School Board had operated under court
supervision for seventeen years when the Supreme Court approved the
district court's decision to terminate partial control. The passage of time,
therefore, should not be a major issue for IPS.
Enforcing a desegregation plan for a reasonable period of time is
only the beginning of the analysis of whether partial release from the
desegregation decree is warranted. The primary issues the district court
must focus upon will be nebulous, intangible considerations. The In-
dianapolis school board must demonstrate that it has satisfactorily com-
plied with the portion of the desegregation decree from which supervision
is to be withdrawn. The district court also will have to examine whether
it is necessary to maintain control over certain aspects of the IPS
desegregation case for which release is being sought (such as student
and/or faculty assignments within IPS), in order to achieve compliance
in other facets of the dual school system. In addition, the Indianapolis
school board also must demonstrate its good faith commitment to the
whole of the court's decree and to the provisions of the law and the
Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention. In making
these determinations, the federal district court will examine the record
of compliance by the Indianapolis school board with its prior decisions.
110. Since Freeman did not involve a cross-district desegregation decree, an argument
can be made that it is not applicable to school systems that are seeking partial termination.
I l1. Eleven years had elapsed during the filing of the initial complaint and the
institution of the court approved plan. On remand, the federal district court concluded
that the School Board had made a sufficient showing to justify the termination of court
supervision as of 1985. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1196 (1991).
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If court supervision over intradistrict student assignments is to be
released, then the district court also must address whether existing racial
segregation in IPS districts is a vestige of the prior de jure conduct or
the result of private decision making. The district court must therefore
determine the cause of residential segregation.
As indicated earlier, Kennedy's opinion appears to imply that the
key to determining whether present residential segregation is the result
of private decision making is mobility. Because it will be necessary to
satisfy Justice Souter, the district court also should make findings con-
cluding that racial imbalance in student assignments is not caused by
past school segregation or the patterns of thinking that segregation
creates.
Finally, since the Supreme Court approved the inquiry into issues
related to quality of education, it is certainly within the discretion of
the district court to consider such factors in determining whether partial
release of court supervision is warranteed in Indianapolis. Consistent
with what the district court in Freeman did, the district court addressing
partial release of the Indianapolis school system may decide to examine
resource allocation to and school performance of the black and white
school children in IPS.
Termination of either the entire school desegregation decree in IPS
or portions of the cross-district component of the desegregation decree
raises extremely complicated issues. When the time comes to address the
termination of any of the cross-district desegregation components, the
district court will have to address such issues as the effect on the students
who attend suburban school systems once court supervision is terminated.
Are they automatically returned to IPS? Should they be considered as
permanently ceded to the suburban school systems? Or should they be
given the choice of choosing to attend suburban schools or IPS? Another
set of important concerns will center around analyzing the issue of
residential segregation, particularly Justice Souter's notion of patterns
of residential thinking which segregation creates. Has Indianapolis created
a pattern of residential thinking that suggests that African-Americans
should not move to some suburban school districts? Issues related to
good faith compliance also will be novel. What should the district court
do if it finds that some, but not all, of the suburban school systems
and the State of Indiana have complied in good faith? These and a
number of other important issues await analysis by the district court.
Because of the relatively unique circumstances caused by the mandatory
cross-district bussing component, I suspect that when these issues are
addressed, there will not be a lot of guidance provided for the district
court from other cases.
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